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LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
INTRODUCTION

Thomas Bordeaux never finished the ninth grade. 1 After drop
ping out of school, he worked as a pipefitter's apprentice and con
tinued to work hard manual labor for the next forty years. 2 In 1997,
Bordeaux, then in his mid-fifties, accepted a position with Pitts
burgh & Conneaut Dock Company where he worked as a structural
welder and pipefitter. 3 These positions required heavy lifting,
manipulating powerful and heavy machinery, and climbing with
tools weighing nearly fifty pounds apiece. 4 Clearly, Bordeaux's
body was his livelihood.
On September 12, 2000, Bordeaux climbed into a deep, narrow
pit to clear coal mud from an intake pipe. 5 While Bordeaux was
bent over, a coworker on the surface lost control of a wet fifty
pound sandbag that fell into the pit, hitting Bordeaux at the base of
his head and neck. 6 Despite receiving emergency treatment imme
diately after the accident and extensive physical and cognitive ther
apies in the years that followed, Bordeaux continued to experience
pain, dizziness, speech problems, and cognitive difficulties that pre
cluded him from returning to work at his previous position, or even
a suitable alternative.7
Although Bordeaux's employer voluntarily began paying some
disability benefits, a dispute later arose as to the precise nature of
Bordeaux's injuries8 : Did they render him partially or totally dis
1. Final Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux at 5, Pittsburgh & Conneaut
Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2005) (No. 05-3425).
2. Id. at 5-6.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2006),
amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007); Final Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux,
supra note 1, at 9; see also infra note 180 for comment regarding amended Pittsburgh &
Conneaut Dock Co. decision.
8. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 625.
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abled? Were they temporary and likely to improve with time, or
had his injuries reached the maximum improvement through physi
cal and cognitive therapy and were now permanent? More than
two years after the injury occurred, Bordeaux, his employer, and a
claims review officer from the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs (OWCP)9 held an informal conference in an attempt to
reach an agreement about the extent and nature of Bordeaux's
injuries. 10
Although the parties tried to settle the dispute through infor
mal proceedings, these negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful,
and Bordeaux pursued a formal hearing before an administrative
law judge (ALJ).u On January 21, 2004, the AU determined that
Bordeaux was totally and permanently disabled and awarded disa
bility benefits commensurate with injuries to that extent. 12 The
ALJ also assessed Bordeaux's attorney's fees to his employer,B
pursuant to a provision in the workers' compensation statute con
trolling Bordeaux's situation. 14 The employer appealed the deci
sion to the Benefits Review Board (BRB), which affirmed the
determination of total and permanent disability, as well as the at
torney fee award (albeit on different grounds within the same work
9. The U.S. Department of Labor is an executive department designed "to foster,
promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United States, to improve
their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employ
ment." 29 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). The Department has designated a number of agencies
to carry out these objectives, including the Employment Standards Administration
(ESA). U.S. Department of Labor, DOL Agencies, hUp:/Iwww.dol.gov/doUorganiza
tion.htm (last visited May 15, 2009). The ESA is in turn responsible for "enhanc[ing]
the welfare and protect[ing] the rights of [American] workers." U.S. Department of
Labor, ESA Mission Statement, hup:/Iwww.dol.gov/esa/aboutlmission.htm (last visited
May 15, 2009). The ESA created the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
(OWCP) to review and enforce financial protections available to injured workers cov
ered under certain federal workers' compensation statutes. See id. Bordeaux was cov
ered by such a federal statute, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
and thus his claim was handled by the OWCP. It is worth noting that the OWCP repre
sentatives that oversee the informal settlement proceedings are referred to in a variety
of ways in judicial and legislative materials: deputy commissioner, claims review officer,
claims officer, and reviewing authority. For the purposes of this Note, these terms are
essentially the same and all refer to the individuals responsible for overseeing the initial
stages of the dispute resolution process.
10. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 625.
11. [d. at 62l.
12. Id. at 620.
13. Id.
14. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-50
(2000). As Bordeaux was engaged in maritime employment, he was a covered em
ployee under § 902(3); thus, the subsequent dispute is governed by that Act.
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ers' compensation statute).15 The employer again took issue with
the determinations of the administrative review agencies and
looked to the United States Court of Appeals for relief. 16
In August of 2006, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the determination
that Bordeaux was totally and permanently disabled and awarded
the benefits attending that status, but reversed the award of attor
ney's fees (previously awarded under § 928(b)), citing the failure of
the claims officer to comply with the specific provisions of the stat
ute, namely his failure to make a written recommendation following
the informal conference held four years earlier .17 In other words,
six years after his injury occurred and his working career ended,
Bordeaux was in the grievous position of having his total and per
manent disability benefits-benefits he and his family needed in the
absence of a paycheck, benefits the reviewing authorities deemed
rightfully his on three separate occasions-now reduced by the cost
to litigate his right to those benefits in the first place.
What if Bordeaux, who was injured in Ohio, had been injured
in California instead? Even if Bordeaux's claim had taken an iden
tical procedural path, he may have prevailed on his claim for attor
ney's fees given the current disparate treatment of attorney's fee
awards under § 928(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act).18 Several jurisdictions rely
strictly on the plain language of the statute to determine whether an
attorney's fee award is appropriate,19 holding that if the procedural
15. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 620. The Longshore and Har
bor Workers' Compensation Act authorizes an award of attorney's fees in two situa
tions. The main difference between them concerns whether the employer has "declined
to pay any compensation," or paid some compensation and "thereafter a controversy
develops over [an] amount of additional compensation, if any, to which the employee
may be entitled." 33 U.S.c. § 928(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
16. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 620. The appellate court re
views the administrative determinations of the administrative law judge (AU) and the
Benefits Review Board (BRB), but does so "on a limited basis." The appellate court's
sole task is to determine whether substantial evidence supported the administrative de
cision and whether the decision was in accordance with applicable law. Id. at 620-21.
17. [d. at 629. For the text of 33 U.S.c. § 928(b), see infra note 105.
18. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. § 928(b); see,
e.g., Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
that the absence of a written recommendation does not preclude recovery of claimant's
attorney's fees).
19. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d 616; Va. Int'l Terminals, Inc. v.
Edwards, 398 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2005); Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2001);
Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000), modified on reh'g, 237 F.3d 409
(5th Cir. 2000); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP, 474
F.3d 109 (4th Cir. 2006).
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steps detailed in the statute are not followed precisely by all parties
involved, fee shifting is prohibited. On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit has persistently declined to read such rigidity into the stat
ute. 20 Instead, it turns to the underlying purpose of the LHWCA,
which is to provide "quick recovery for valid workplace-injury
claims without resort to the courts, and when [that] fails, claimants'
full recovery of statutory benefits without reduction by the cost of
legal services."21 Citing concerns about fairness, equity, and legisla
tive intent, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a broad reading of the
attorney's fees provision to carry out the legislative intent of quick
and adequate recovery of valid workplace claims. 22
There has been ongoing tension between readings confined to
the (alleged) "plain language" of the statute and those broader
readings that look beyond the express language of the provision to
fulfill the legislature'S objectives. In essence, the controversy boils
down to a question of statutory interpretation. Although the
weight of authority favors a strict reading requiring absolute adher
ence to the procedures enumerated in 33 U.S.c. § 928, this Note
posits that a broad reading is in fact more appropriate in a circum
stance such as Bordeaux'S, where the inability to recoup attorney's
fees is the direct result of the failures of others to discharge their
statutory duties. This conclusion is reached after an examination of
early workplace liability theory, workers' compensation law gener
ally, the provisions of the LHWCA, the legislative concerns that the
Act sought to address, and the policies that have been expressed in
judicial opinions pertaining to the Act.
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the liability theory
in the workplace, the circumstances that gave rise to workers' com
pensation law, and the policy considerations that underpin current
workers' compensation legislation. Part II explores the genesis of
workers' compensation for maritime workers, lays out the provi
sions of the LHWCA, and reviews the judicial applications and in
terpretations of the Act since its enactment in 1927. Part III
examines the ways in which the courts have interpreted and applied
20. Everitt v. OWCP, 107 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2004); Matulic v. OWCP, 154
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1998); Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding. Co., 606 F.2d 875; see also Savan
nah Mach. & Shipyard Co. v. OWCP, 642 F.2d 887, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
deviation from provisions of § 928(b) does not preclude eventual recovery of attorney's
fees).
21. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 630.
22. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding. Co., 606 F.2d 875; see also Matulic, 154 F.3d 1052;
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991).
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§ 928, the fee-shifting provision of the LHWCA,23 and scrutinizes

the majority and dissenting opinions of a recent Sixth Circuit deci
sion, which deftly illustrates the continuing disparate judicial treat
ment of this provision of the LHWCA.
Part IV analyzes the controversy in light of the general policies
underpinning workers' compensation law, the congressional intent
behind the LHWCA, and the precise language employed in the dis
puted provision. This Note concludes that the current circuit split
should be resolved in favor of a broad reading of § 928(b) to con
form with the history, policy, and intent behind the LHWCA and
workers' compensation statutes generally by allowing a claimant
such as Bordeaux to recover the litigation costs incurred to estab
lish his right to workers' compensation.
I.

THE ADVENT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Workers' compensation coverage is something many people
take for granted-if an employee is injured while on the job, there
are often provisions in place to cover medical bills, lost time, and if
necessary, injuries resulting in disability. Workers' compensation
did not always exist, however; it is a remedy that is little more than
23. Statutory fee-shifting provisions represent a departure from the usual rule. In
the United States, the successful litigant generally is not permitted to recover his attor
ney's fees from the losing party. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Servo CO. V. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); F.D. Rich Co., Inc. V. U.S. for the Use of Indus. Lumber
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974); Fleishmann Distilling Corp. V. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Stewart V. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 190 (1878); see also Day v.
Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372 (1851) (noting that state legislatures have "re
fused to allow the honorarium paid to counsel to be exacted from the losing party");
Arcambel V. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (noting that the inclusion of
attorney's fees in an award for damages is generally opposed). This general rule,
known as the "American Rule," is still firmly rooted in American jurisprudence, al
though a number of exceptions to the rule have developed in response to concerns
about justice and equity. See, e.g., F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129 (recognizing that attor
ney's fee awards are appropriate when the losing party has "acted in bad faith, vexa
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons" (citing Vaughan V. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527
(1962»); see also id. at 130 (acknowledging that fee shifting is appropriate when the
prevailing party "has conferred a substantial benefit on a class of persons and the
court's shifting of fees operates to spread the cost proportionately among the members
of the benefited class" (citing Hall V. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1974»). The most common class
of exceptions to the American Rule, however, is one created by Congress. 1 MARY
FRANCIS DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES <JI 5.01[1],
at 5-3 (2008). Statutory provisions providing for fee shifting are now common and
widespread. See id. One such legislated exception to the American Rule forms the
very basis of this Note. See Part III, infra, for further discussion of the fee-shifting
provision within the LHWCA.
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a century 01d. 24 Subpart A of this Part looks at common law reme
dies available to injured workers before the modern workers' com
pensation system. Subpart B discusses the Industrial Revolution
and the socioeconomic pressures that changed the way workplace
injuries were handled in the legislature and judiciary. Subpart C
outlines the basic policies underpinning modern workers' compen
sation legislation.
A.

Liability for Workers' Injuries Under the Common Law

Two hundred years ago, the occurrence of workplace injuries
was rare. 25 When a worker did sustain an injury on the job, the
employer, often working closely and being friendly with the em
ployee, might have provided the necessary medical care and finan
cial assistance out of sympathy.26 Absent this emotional response
on the part of the employer, the injured worker's only alternative
was to seek redress by suing the employer, alleging negligence of a
common law duty.27 At that time, the duties imposed on an em
ployer under the common law were few: (1) to provide a safe place
to work; (2) to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment; (3) to
give warnings of dangers of which the employee might be unaware;
(4) to provide a sufficient number of fit, trained, or suitable fellow
servants to perform assigned tasks; and (5) to promulgate and en
force rules relating to employee conduct that would make the work
safe. 28 In order for a worker to recover for injuries sustained, the
worker had to demonstrate a violation of one of the duties listed
above and, thus, that the employer was somehow at fault for the
worker's injury.29
See infra Part I.C
See SAMUEL B. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COM
PENSATION LAWS 2 (1944).
26. ld.
27. ld.; Samuel B. Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's
Compensation, reprinted in CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 466-67
(1947) [hereinafter Horovitz, Current Trends].
24.

25.

28. ARTHUR LARSON,
§ 4.30 (1984).

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND

TEXT

29. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 466-67.
For generations one person's liability to another was based on fault, or negli
gence. If none existed, there was no redress. Too bad that the worker lost a
leg, or arm, or eye, in the factory, or at work elsewhere; but the employer not
being at fault, it was inconceivable to the early judges that the employer
should be held liable, or in any way be compelled to contribute toward medi
cal treatment or the support of the worker or his family. No fault, no liability.
No liability, and charity or the worker's savings or friends (if any) stood the
entire loss.
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Notwithstanding the lengthy and costly process of filing suit
and the additional strain placed on an already physically and finan
cially impaired worker,3° the employee's claim had little likelihood
of success in the face of the three common law defenses available to
employers: the doctrines of (1) contributory negligence; (2) assump
tion of risk; and (3) the fellow-servant rule. 31 Even if the worker
could demonstrate the direct negligence of the employer, "recovery
would be defeated by the [contributory] negligence-even much
smaller in degree-of the employee."32 Similarly, if workers com
prehended (or should have comprehended) risks inherent in dis
charging their duties and assumed those risks anyway, "the
employee[s], being free to do as [they] please[], and voluntarily un
dergoing the dangerous conditions of the work, [have] no standing
to complain when injury does occur as a result of [those] condi
tions."33 Finally, if the injury sustained by the worker was not
caused by the employer personally, but rather by a fellow em
ployee, the employer was not liable for the injury under the theory
that the negligence of another employee was one of the risks as
sumed by accepting employment. 34 The fellow-servant rule was
particularly damaging to claims for recovery, since an employer
could avoid liability under this doctrine entirely by simply staying
Id.

30. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 2 (noting that once suit had been filed, an in
jured worker often faced a wait of two or more years before reaching trial and that "his
limited savings and public charity bore the burden" in the interim).
31. Id. at 2-3; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 467; see also Owens v.
Union Pac. RR Co., 319 U.S. 715,720-24 (1943) (discussing the scope and application
of each common law defense (citing Priestly v. Fowler, 3 Mees & W. 1 (1837))). The
contributory negligence doctrine permits an employer to escape liability for an em
ployee's injury when the employer can demonstrate that, even though the employer has
been negligent in some capacity, the injured worker was also somehow negligent, and
thus played a role in his own injury. The assumption of risk defense is grounded in the
notion that the employee is free to object to dangerous working conditions and, if the
employee chooses to work in them, he has no standing to complain when he is injured
as a result of them. The fellow-servant rule allows an employer to avoid liability when
an employee has been injured as a result of conduct by another employee, the theory
being that the employer cannot be held accountable for the actions of its staff. See
generally LARSON, supra note 28, § 4.30 (describing the common law defenses and the
general problems attendant thereto). For a detailed discussion of the factual and legal
foundation for the holding in the British case Priestly v. Fowler, which established early
common law pertaining to employer defenses to negligence, see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON,
LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 100-34 (1995).
32. LARSON, supra note 28, § 4.30.
33. Id.
34. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 3; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at
467.
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out of the workplace. 35 Of the small number of cases that did sur
vive to trial and were ultimately successful, the worker's "victory"
was a hollow one; "lawyer's fees, doctor's bills and other expenses
often ate up a substantial portion of the award. "36
Returning to the circumstances of Bordeaux's injury detailed
in the Introduction, how would he have fared under the common
law? Even if Bordeaux could marshal a valid argument that his
employer had neglected its duty to provide a safe place to work, or
failed to provide warning of dangers about which Bordeaux was un
aware, or did not provide trained and suitable coworkers to accom
plish the employment tasks with which they were charged, it seems
that Bordeaux's employer could almost certainly defeat his claim
with one or more of the three defenses outlined above. The com
pany might argue that Bordeaux was in part to blame for his injury
because, by bending over (rather than kneeling) to clear the pipe,
he exposed the area at the base of his head and neck left unpro
tected by his hard hat. Alternatively, his employer might argue that
in accepting a position that he knew to involve heavy machinery
and tools and in subsequently climbing into the pit to clear the in
take pipe, he assumed the risk that one of those heavy objects
might fall and injure him. The employer's strongest argument
under the common law would likely be the fellow-servant defense,
since it was a fellow employee, and not his employer personally,
who dropped the sandbag that injured him. Overall, Bordeaux's
ability to establish any liability under the common law on the part
of his employer seems very unlikely. Since Bordeaux had no expe
rience or ability to secure alternate employment,37 he and his family
would have to rely on any savings and the charity of friends and his
community for support for the remainder of his life: a brutal and
inequitable reality.
B.

The Industrial Revolution and Resulting Socioeconomic
Pressures

While the common law remedies affected relatively few people
in this country's early years of agricultural and rural life, the num
ber of people affected by these inadequate remedies exploded once
35.

HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 3; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at

36.

HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 4; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at

467.
467.

37. See Fmal Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux, supra note 1, at 13-14
(describing Bordeaux'S limited education, narrow work experience, and advanced age).
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the Industrial Revolution began.38 Responding to increasing pres
sure from injured workers and union representatives, some courts
modified the existing common law fellow-servant defense with the
vice-principal exception. 39 This exception basically excluded em
ployees charged with carrying out the employer's common law du
ties to provide a safe work environment, adequate tools, and
suitably-trained coworkers, from the group of employees to be con
sidered the injured employee's "fellow-servant[s]."4o Similarly,
state and federal governments passed legislation that chipped away
at the draconian results of the common law, but these legislative
modifications continued to center on fault, rather than the relation
ship of the employee to the employer.41 Despite the judicial and
legislative modifications, the basic provisions of the common law
were still intact and binding upon the courtS.42
38. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 466 ("As the factory system grew,
as industries of all kinds brought large numbers of workers into close contact with ma
chinery and with each other, the number of injuries and fatalities skyrocketed. Injured
workers and their dependents were compelled to look to the courts for redress. ").
39. See, e.g., New Eng. RR Co. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323, 345 (1899). An em
ployer's liability for the negligence of an employee that injures another hinges on:
the character of the act . . . . If the act is one done in the discharge of some
[common law] duty of the master to the servant, then negligence in that act is
the negligence of the master; but if it be not one in the discharge of such
[common law] duty, then there should be some personal wrong on the part of
the employer before he is held liable therefor.
[d. See generally Bait. & Ohio RR Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 386-90 (1893) (provid
ing in-depth discussion of the duties of the master to the servant, as well as the scope of
same).
40. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 149 U.S. at 386-90; see also LARSON, supra note 28,
§ 4.40 (noting that the vice-principal exception was "[t]he principal modification of the
common law defenses").
41. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, ch. 149, § 1,35 Stat. 65, 65
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.c. § 51 (2000}) (eliminated contributory negligence and
assumption of risk defenses in cases involving safety violations); Georgia Act of 1855,
1855 Ga. Laws 155 (eliminated the fellow-servant defense for railroad employers); LAR
SON, supra note 28, § 4.50 ("These so-called employers' liability statutes did not aspire
to create any new principle of liability applicable to the employment relation as such.
The most they ever set out to accomplish was the restoration of the employee to a
position no worse than that of a stranger injured by the negligence of the employer or
his servants. ").
42. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 468; see also W. Indemnity Co. v.
Pillsbury, 151 P. 398, 401 (Cal. 1915) ("[T]hese statutes, one and all, rest on the underly
ing notion that the common-law remedy by action, with the requirements of proof inci
dent to that remedy, involves intolerable delay and great economic waste, gives
inadequate relief for loss and suffering, operates unequally as between different individ
uals in like circumstances, and that, whether viewed from the standpoint of the em
ployer or that of the employe, it is inequitable and unsuited to the conditions of modem
industry. ").
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Responding to the voting power of the people increasingly af
fected by injuries and death in the Industrial Age,43 state govern
ments began to acknowledge the need for a radical overhaul of the
current treatment of workplace injury claims.44 Taking cues from a
German model of workers' compensation legislation which com
pensated employees based on their role as employees, rather than
as simply parties injured due to the negligence of another,45 various
state governments formed commissions at the turn of the century to
evaluate potential solutions to the workers' compensation prob
lem.46 Although application of the first state workers' compensa
tion statutes were delayed on constitutional grounds,47 the new
objectives underpinning these first enactments were clear:
[T]o make the risk of the accident one of the industry itself, to
follow from the fact of the injury, and hence that compensation
on account thereof should be treated as an element in the cost of
production, added to the cost of the article and borne by the
community in general.
[T]o substitute a more humanitarian and economical system of
compensation for injured workmen or their dependents in case of
their death; to provide a speedy and inexpensive method by
which such compensation might be made to such employees or
43. Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at 468.
44. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20; see also HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 6; 1
WILLIAM R. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 2 (1932); Horovitz,
Current Trends, supra note 27, at 469.
Legislate as we may in the line of stringent requirements for safety devices ...
the army of the injured will still increase, the price of our manufacturing great
ness will still have to be paid in human blood and tears. To speak of the com
mon-law personal injury action as a remedy for this problem is to jest with
serious subjects, to give a stone to one who asks for food.
HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 6 (quoting Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 215 (Wis.
1911».
45. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 5; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at
469; see also LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20.
46. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20.
47. Franklin v. United Railway & Electric Co., 2 Bait. City Rep. 309 (1904), held
unconstitutional a 1902 Maryland law establishing an "accident fund" for injured min
ers on the basis that it violated the separation of powers doctrine and deprived the
defendant of a jury trial. Similarly, Cunningham v. Nonhwestern Improvement Co., 119
P. 554 (Mont. 1911), held unconstitutional a 1908 Montana law creating an indemnity
fund to compensate injured employees on the grounds that, once compensation had
been paid under the statute, the employer was still potentially liable in the courts for
damages. In other words, the statute failed to provide the employer with equal protec
tion of the laws by potentially subjecting it to double payments. See HOROVITZ, supra
note 25, at 6; LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.20; Horovitz, Current Trends, supra note 27, at
469-70.
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those dependent upon them and which is more in harmony with
modern methods of industry.... [and] to substitute a more uni
form scale of compensation in case of accidental injury or death,
than the ordinary varying and widely divergent estimates of
..
Junes
.... 48

Consequently, once the constitutional issues had been resolved,
adoption of workers' compensation legislation was rapid. By 1920,
employees in the vast majority of states could recover for their em
ployment injuries under newly enacted workers' compensation
statutes. 49
C.

Modern Workers' Compensation Legis/ation

More than a century has gone by since Maryland passed the
first workers' compensation statute in 1902.50 In that time, the state
and federal governments have wrestled with the boundaries of com
pensation legislation, but overall have exhibited a general tendency
towards enlarging the scope of coverage as to the types of activities,
persons, injuries (and more recently, diseases51 ), and occupations
covered. 52 As of 1995, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated six
basic objectives underlying workers' compensation legislation:
1. To provide sure, prompt and reasonable income and med
ical benefits to work-accident victims, or income benefits to their
dependents, regardless of fault;
2. To provide a single remedy and reduce court delays, costs
and workloads arising out of personal injury litigation;
3. To relieve public and private charities of financial drains
incidental to uncompensated industrial accidents;
4. To eliminate payment of fees to lawyers and witnesses as
well as to time-consuming trials and appeals;
5. To encourage maximum employer interest in safety and
rehabilitation through appropriate experience-rating mecha
nisms; and
48. 1 SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 2, 4-5; see, e.g., Bundy v. Vt. State Highway
Dep't, 146 A. 68, 69 (Vt. 1929) ("The ultimate purpose of the Workmen's Compensa
tion Act ... is to treat the cost of personal injuries incidental to the employment as part
of the cost of the business. ").
49. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.30.
50. ld. § 5.20.
5!. See, e.g., Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,
§ 401, 83 Stat. 742, 792 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 901 (2000» (providing
compensation benefits for coal miners totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, or "black
lung disease," arising out of their work in coal mines).
52. LARSON, supra note 28, § 5.30.
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6. To promote frank study of causes of accidents-rather
than concealment of fault-reducing preventable accidents and
human suffering. 53

Much has changed about the way workplace injuries are han
dled since the pre-Industrial Revolution era. Although workers'
compensation, as a body of law, is now accepted as a "given," it
took time for it to spread to the great number of industries that it
affects today. The first attempts to secure compensation for injuries
sustained, whether under the common law or the initial workers'
compensation statutes, were made by employees of the railroad and
mining industries. 54 The LHWCA covers employees engaged in
maritime employment,55 and just like any other industry that pres
ently enjoys the protections of a workers' compensation statute, it
took time for the legislature to promulgate workers' compensation
laws that covered maritime workers specifically.
II.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION FOR MARITIME AND
HARBOR WORKERS

Just as the first state workers' compensation statutes were
struck down as unconstitutional, the same was true for the prelimi
nary attempts to apply state law compensation law to maritime
workers. 56 The first attempt was Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
which involved a claim for death benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of New YorkY The dispute hinged largely on
jurisdictional issues, namely, that the decedent was engaged in mar
itime employment, and jurisdiction over maritime matters is dele
gated exclusively to the federal government pursuant to Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. 58 Accordingly, the Court held that
53. MARGARET C. JASPER, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 2 (1997) (citing U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1995 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS
(1995».
54. See, e.g., Owens v. Union Pac. RR Co., 319 U.S. 715 (1943); New Eng. RR
Co. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323, 345 (1899); Bait. & Ohio RR Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368,
386-90 (1893); w. Indem. Co. v. Pillsbury, 151 P. 398, 401 (Cal. 1915); Franklin v.
United Ry. & Elec. Co., 2 BaIt. City Rep. 309 (Md. 1904); Cunningham v. Nw. Improve
ment Co., 119 P. 554 (Mont. 1911).
55. 33 U.S.c. § 902(3) (2000).
56. Washington v. W.c. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227 (1924); Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
57. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205.
58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made ... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."). See generally Charles
Clark, The Expanding Coverage o/the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compen
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the New York statute was invalid in that it appropriated power ex
clusively within the jurisdiction of the federal government. 59
The next attempt to apply state compensation law to maritime
workers came in 1920 with Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,60
which failed for similar jurisdictional reasons. After the decision in
Jensen, the Congress explicitly reserved jurisdiction over workers'
compensation law of any state to the district courtS.61 Yet, the Su
preme Court struck down this attempt to apply state compensation
law to maritime employees, stating that the Constitution gave Con
gress a nondelegable power to legislate admiralty and maritime
law. 62
Finally recognizing the need to legislate directly, Congress pro
vided workers' compensation coverage to maritime employees
when it enacted the LHWCA in 1927. Subpart A that follows
briefly discusses the basic features of the 1927 enactment, as well as
the notable changes incorporated by the amendments in 1972 and
1984. Subpart B discusses the policies that have emerged from judi
cial application of the LHWCA.
A.

LHWCA: Original Enactment and Amendments

The original version of the LHWCA63 had a simple stated goal:
"[t]o provide compensation for disability or death resulting from
injury to employees in certain maritime employments."64 The sub
sation Act, 43 LA. L. REV. 849 (1983); Charles F. Tucker, Coverage and Procedure
Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Subsequent to the
1972 Amendments, 55 TuL. L. REv. 1056 (1981) (discussing the Jensen case in greater
detail, along with the jurisdictional issues that remained even after the passage of the
LHWCA).
59. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217-18.
60. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
61. Id. at 156.
62. Id. at 164 (referencing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8). Four years after the Knicker
bocker decision, the Supreme Court issued yet another opinion on the inapplicability of
state compensation laws to maritime workers. Perhaps realizing that Congress had not
picked up on the subtleties of the previous two decisions, it took a more direct approach
in Washington v. W.e. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), when it stated:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime law
by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This
power, we think, would permit enactment of a general Employers' Liability
Law or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not
be delegated to the several states.
Id. at 227.
63. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat.
1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.s.C. §§ 901-950 (2000)).
64. /d.
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sections of the Act defined the injuries covered,65 definitions and
exclusiveness of liability,66 and claims procedures (including proce
dure for claims that the employer disputed).67 However, the origi
nal enactment did not include the fee-shifting provision for
attorney's fees that appeared in later versions. Instead, section 28
of the 1927 LHWCA limited any claim for fees for services to those
which the deputy commissioner specifically approved, and those
fees that were approved constituted a lien on the compensation
award,68 effectively reducing the funds actually awarded to the in
jured employee, as in other areas of litigation that follow the Amer
ican Rule. 69 Despite being drafted and enacted in the early stages
of workers' compensation law, the 1927 version of the LHWCA re
mained largely intact for nearly fifty years.
The LHWCA underwent a major overhaul in 1972, in part to
clarify and expand the class of employees that came under the juris
diction of the LHWCAJo In addition to expanding the class of
65. Id. § 3(a) ("Compensation shall be payable under this Act ... only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery ... may not validly be provided
by State law. ").
66. Id. § 4(b) ("Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for
the injury."); Id. § 5 ("The liability ... prescribed ... shall be exclusive ... except that if
an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this Act, [the in
jured worker] may elect to . . . maintain an action at law or in admiralty. . . .
[D]efendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of
a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that
the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee.").
67. Id. §§ 12-23.
68. Id. § 28(a).
69. See supra note 23 for discussion of the American Rule.
70. See generally Clark, supra note 58, at 852-54; Tucker, supra note 58, at 1056
60. Under the 1927 LHWCA, the express language of the statute confined coverage
only to those employees injured "upon the navigable waters of the United States" when
recovery is not "validly" available under state law. Longshoremen's and Harbor Work
ers' Compensation Act § 3(a). The courts struggled with this bright jurisdictional line
between state and federal claims, since the nature of some employment and resulting
claims left unclear whether the state or federal compensation legislation properly ap
plied (this jurisdictional grey area later became known as the "twilight zone"). See
Clark, supra note 58, at 853. Applying for compensation in the wrong forum could
potentially leave the worker without any recovery at all due to expiration of the perti
nent statute of limitations. See Thcker, supra note 58, at 1059. Although the courts
eventually developed a concurrent jurisdiction doctrine to address "twilight zone" cov
erage issues, additional interpretive questions arose as to whether maritime workers
injured on the shores ide of the twilight zone could still be covered under the LHWCA.
Id.; see also Clark, supra note 58, at 853. The judiciary, however, was unwilling to
accept and apply this interpretation in the absence of Congressional authority. Clark,
supra note 58, at 853 n.37. Congress addressed these issues directly in the 1972 Amend
ments to the LHWCA.
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workers whose injuries would fall within the scope of the
LHWCA71 and increasing benefit awards for those workers (or
their families in the case of death),n the 1972 Amendments elimi
nated the requirement that the injured employee have no valid re
covery available under state law to be eligible for LHWCA
coverage. 73 The Amendments also reformed and standardized ad
ministrative procedures concerning claims for compensation. 74 This
included two changes to the decision review process: access to an
internal administrative review75 and, more significantly for the pur
poses of this Note, the addition of an attorney fee-shifting provision
for injured employees forced to resort to the services of an attorney
to secure the compensation benefits the employer was unwilling to
pay.76 Overall, the sweeping changes enacted by the 1972 Amend
ments were evidence of the congressional intent "to provide a mod
ern workmen's compensation program for a substantial number of
American workers and their families."77
B.

Judicial Application of the LHWCA

Since the LHWCA's enactment in 1927, the courts that apply
its provisions have consistently and repeatedly stressed the impor
tance of liberal application in favor of the injured worker.78 This
71. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(c), 86 Stat. 1251, 1251 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.c.
902 (2000» (expanding coverage to those injuries occurring on navigable waters to in
clude "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or
other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in the loading, unloading, repair
ing, or building a vessel").
72. Id. § 5.
73. Id. § 2(c).
74. Id. § 14.
75. Id. § 15. A worker had to resort directly to the district court for review of any
compensation award under the LHWCA of 1927.
76. Id. § 13; see infra Part III.
77. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698,4711 (empha
sis added). Congress passed another Amendment to the LHWCA in 1984, but the
changes enacted did not substantively change matters relating to the claims review pro
cess that is of primary concern in this Note. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compen
sation Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1639 (1984) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950).
78. See OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1983); Voris v.
Eikel, 346 U.S 328, 333 (1953) ("This Act must be liberally construed in conformance
with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results." (citing Bait.
& Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932))}; Pillsbury v. United Eng'g
Co., 342 U.S. 197, 200 (1952) ("[T]his is a humanitarian Act, and ... should be con
strued liberally to effectuate its purposes."); Bait. & Phi/a. Steamboat Co., 284 U.S. 408;
Southern S.S. Co. v. Norton, 101 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1939); Candado Stevedoring Corp. v.
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subpart will review some of the key decisions that have shaped the
judiciary's treatment of the Act.
Only five years after the LHWCA was enacted, the Court's de
cision in Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton 79 estab
lished some basic policy considerations still in use today. While the
specific facts of the case are somewhat unremarkable,80 the Court
made the following statement as to its approach in construing and
applying the statute:
[Workers' compensation] laws operate to relieve persons suffer
ing such misfortunes of a part of the burden and to distribute it to
the industries and mediately to those served by them. They are
deemed to be in the public interest and should be construed liber
ally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted and,
if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results. 81

In the decade that followed, several Federal Courts of Appeal
decisions reinforced the importance of liberal application. In
Candado Stevedoring Corp. v. Lowe,82 an employee of Candado
Stevedoring Corporation was injured while working on a barge
owned by Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. 83 The injured employee origi
nally filed suit against the barge owner, alleging negligence for a
defective hatch cover,84 but later, for reasons not within the record,
had a default judgment entered against him. The court subse
quently entered a decree absolving the barge owner of liability
entirely.85
At some point after the court decree was entered, the claimant
also filed a claim for compensation from his employer, Candado,
Lowe, 85 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1936); see also Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d
887,889 (9th Cir. 1993); Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Assocs., Inc., 655 F.2d 589, 592
(5th Cir. 1981); Mich. Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The
effort in every case should ... be to follow the Supreme Court's twice-voiced directive
that the Longshoremen's Act 'must be liberally construed in conformance with its pur
pose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.' ").
79. Bait. & Phi/a. Steamboat Co., 284 U.S. 408.
80. The claim, brought by the employer of an injured longshore worker, involved
a dispute over the computation method of the claimant's compensation award, as deter
mined by the application of various equations based on the type and duration of disabil
ity suffered. Id. at 410-12.
81. Id. at 414 (emphasis added) (citing Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640
(1930».
82. Can dado Stevedoring Corp., 85 F.2d 119.
83. Id. at 120.
84. Id.
85.

Id.
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and was awarded compensation to be paid by the employer. 86 The
employer appealed the award to the Second Circuit Court of Ap
peals, arguing that the earlier default in the case against the barge
owner amounted to a forfeiture of his right to compensation.87 Up
holding the claimant's award from the deputy commissioner and
lower court, the Second Circuit restated that the right to compensa
tion ought to be "treated in a liberal spirit and only denied where
some injustice or injury to the employer appears."88 Noting that
the employer failed to preserve the issue on which it later relied,
the court went on to comment that "[t]he right of the employee
should not be defeated by mere technicalities."89
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit weighed in on the
issue of application in Southern Steamship Co. v. Norton. 90 The
claimant in that case, Jackson, sustained a back injury and was sent
to his employer's physician for evaluation and treatment. 91 After a
month of treatment, Jackson returned to his job for four days but
was dismissed for reasons unrelated to his injury.92 The compensa
tion claim submitted to the deputy commissioner resulted in a de
termination of partial disability, which, in turn, resulted in reduced
earning capacity and an associated compensation award. 93
The employer sought judicial review of the award, arguing that
Jackson's dismissal for independent reasons precluded his partial
disability recovery on the grounds of decreased earning capacity.94
Once the case reached the Third Circuit, the court noted that the
employer was essentially requesting that it reweigh the evidence al
ready assessed by the deputy commissioner. 95 Refusing to do so,
the court pointed out that its role was simply to assess whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the deputy commissioner's
determination, as evaluated against "a liberal construction of the
Act" and a presumption "that doubts should be resolved in [the
claimant's] favor."96
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
89. Id.
90. Southern S.S. Co. v. Norton, 101 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1939).
91. Id. at 826.
92. Id.
93. /d.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 826-27.
96. Id. at 827 (citing BaIt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 404, 414
(1932); Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Burris, 59 F.2d 1042, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1932)) .
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In just over a decade, these three decisions ushered in an estab
lished preference for a liberal construction of the LHWCA in favor
of the injured worker, and subsequent decisions only reinforced this
approach. 97 One case even upheld a compensation award in the
absence of written notice of injury to the employer, ostensibly a
requirement under § 912 of the LHWCA.98 In Voris v. Eikel, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a worker seriously injured in an
incident witnessed by many people, including at least one supervi
sor,99 despite the claimant's failure to submit written notice of in
jury to his employer until long after the thirty-day notice window
had lapsed.1°o Noting its duty to construe the statute liberally so as
to avoid "harsh and incongruous results," the Court reviewed the
circumstances of the injury and rejected the employer's argument
that the claim for compensation was defeated due to lack of suffi
97. See OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1983); Voris v.
Eikel, 346 U.S 328, 333 (1953) ("This Act must be liberally construed in conformance
with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results." (citing Bait.
& Phi/a. Steamboat Co., 284 U.S. at 414)); Pillsbury v. United Eng'g Co., 342 U.S. 197,
200 (1952) ("[T]his is a humanitarian Act, and ... should be construed liberally to
effectuate its purposes ...."); see also Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d 887,
889 (9th Cir. 1993); Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Assocs., Inc., 655 F.2d 589, 592 (5th
Cir. 1981); Mich. Mut. Liab. Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The effort
in every case should ... be to follow the Supreme Court's twice-voiced directive that
the Longshoremen's Act 'must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose,
and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.'" (quoting Reed v. S.S. Yaka,
373 U.S. 410, 415 (1963); Voris, 346 U.S at 333)).
98. Voris, 346 U.S 328. The original language of 33 U.S.c. § 912 provides, in part:
(a) Notice of an injury or death in respect of which compensation is pay
able under this Act shall be given within thirty days after the date of such
injury or death (1) to the deputy commissioner in the compensation district in
which such injury occurred and (2) to the employer.
(b) Such notice shall be in writing, shall contain the name and address of
the employee and a statement of the time, place, nature, and cause of injury or
death, and shall be signed by the employee or by some person on his behalf

(d) Failure to give such notice shall not bar any claim under this Act (1) if
the employer (or his agent in charge of the business in the place where the
injury occurred) or the carrier had knowledge of the injury or death and the
deputy commissioner determines that the employer or carrier has not been
prejudiced by failure to give such notice, or (2) if the deputy commissioner
excuses such failure on the ground that for some satisfactory reason such no
tice could not be given ....
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 12, 44 Stat. 1424,
1431 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.c. § 912 (2000)).
99. Voris, 346 U.S. at 330-32.
100. Id. at 330.

2009]

FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?

851

cient notice. lOi The LHWCA, it held, was "designed to provide
compensation for the included workers, regardless of whether writ
ten notice was given. "102 In sum, the courts have established a long
and consistent record of liberal application of the LHWCA to an
injured worker's claim for compensation benefits.

III.

THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER

§ 928(b)

So what's the problem? The LHWCA was enacted to provide
injured maritime workers access to workers' compensation benefits
similar to those available to their landward peers,103 and court rul
ings since its inception indicate a clear preference toward liberal
interpretation that will award those benefits to the injured em
ployee.1 04 It seems only logical then that the courts' decisions
would reflect this longstanding preference on all provisions of the
LHWCA, including those for attorney's fees.
Section 928 of the current version of the LHWCA provides for
an award of attorney's fees in two distinct circumstances. 105 Sub
101. [d. at 332-34. The claimant was injured when a flash fire broke out in the
hold of a ship, causing workers to "fle[e] in terror." [d. at 330. In the midst of the
commotion, with many people present, the claimant was struck by a beam with such
force that the blow rendered him unable to walk. [d. Immediately thereafter, several
of his supervisors were orally informed of the serious injury, and one such supervisor
maneuvered the claimant to his car, drove him home, and promised to take him to a
doctor. [d. at 332. Despite this course of events, formal written notice was not submit
ted until six months after the accident, and the employer tried to use this fact as lever
age to escape liability, alleging that 33 U.S.c. § 912( d) is not satisfied unless the
employer has "actual personal knowledge of the injury." [d. Citing ample evidence
that the employer had actual notice of the injury and the supervisors' failure to follow
internal injury reporting procedures, the court declined to accept the employer's argu
ment, decrying it as "indefensible." [d.
102. [d. at 334.
103. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, at Introduction
(stating that the purpose of the Act is "[t]o provide compensation for disability or death
resulting from injury to employees in certain maritime employments").
104. See BaIt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408 (1932); Southern
S.S. Co. v. Norton, 101 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1939); Can dado Stevedoring Corp. v. Lowe, 85
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1936); cases cited supra note 97.
105. Section 928 provides in part:
(a) If the employer or carrier declines to pay any compensation on or
before the thirtieth day after receiving written notice of a claim for compensa
tion having been filed from the deputy commissioner, on the ground that there
is no liability for compensation within the provisions of this chapter and the
person seeking benefits shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attor
ney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim, there shall be awarded, in
addition to the award of compensation, in a compensation order, a reasonable
attorney's fee against the employer or carrier in an amount approved by the
deputy commissioner, Board, or court, as the case may be, which shall be paid
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section (a) of § 928 addresses the circumstances in which an em
ployer has refused to pay any compensation after receipt of notice
of injury and the claimant is thereafter successful in securing com
pensation benefits with the assistance of counseL Subsection (b)
covers those circumstances in which the employer has paid some
compensation after receipt of notice of injury, but the precise com
pensation due is disputed by the employer and employee. In such a
case, subsection (b) provides a procedure for the employee, em
ployer, and reviewing authority to follow in resolving the dispute.
If the dispute is resolved in favor of the employee who secures com
pensation in addition to that which the employer originally paid, a
reasonable attorney's fee "shall" be awarded. 106
When Congress drafted the attorney's fee provisions of the
LHWCA, it likely envisioned a § 928(b) dispute to play out as fol
lows: First, the employer would offer some compensation to its em
ployee following a workplace injury, but the parties would
ultimately disagree on the precise amount of compensation due.
The parties would refer the dispute to an OWCP claims officer who
would schedule an informal conference between the parties in an
attempt to mediate a settlement. After the informal conference,
the claims officer, having heard arguments from both employer and
directly by the employer or carrier to the attorney for the claimant in a lump
sum after the compensation order becomes final.
(b) If the employer or carrier pays or tenders payment of compensation
without an award pursuant to section 914 (a) and (b) of this title, and thereaf
ter a controversy develops over the amount of additional compensation, if any,
to which the employee may be entitled, the deputy commissioner or Board
shall set the matter for an informal conference and following such conference
the deputy commissioner or Board shall recommend in writing a disposition of
the controversy. If the employer or carrier refuse to accept such written rec
ommendation, within fourteen days after its receipt by them, they shall payor
tender to the employee in writing the additional compensation, if any, to
which they believe the employee is entitled. If the employee refuses to accept
such payment or tender of compensation, and thereafter utilizes the services of
an attorney at law, and if the compensation thereafter awarded is greater than
the amount paid or tendered by the employer or carrier, a reasonable attor
ney's fee based solely upon the difference between the amount awarded and
the amount tendered or paid shall be awarded in addition to the amount of
compensation. . . . If the claimant is successful in review proceedings before
the Board or court in any such case an award may be made in favor of the
claimant and against the employer or carrier for a reasonable attorney's fee
for claimant's counsel in accord with the above provisions. In all other cases
any claim for legal services shall not be assessed against the employer or
carrier.
33 U.S.c. § 928(a)-(b) (2000).
106. Id. § 928(b).

FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?

2009]

853

employee, would issue a written recommendation suggesting the
terms of settlement. If both parties accepted the recommendation,
the dispute was settled. If the employer refused to accept the rec
ommendation, the employer might choose to make a second offer
of settlement. If the employee was still dissatisfied with the offer
tendered and subsequently obtained a greater award through for
mal proceedings with the help of an attorney, § 928(b) provides a
mechanism by which the employee could recoup the legal fees she
incurred to secure the additional compensation.
Although the procedure outlined in the statute seems fairly
straightforward on paper, compliance has proven difficult in prac
tice. The controversy and the topic of this Note, centers on the re
quired degree of compliance with the procedure in subsection
(b).1D7 Must each step be followed precisely in order to authorize
an award of attorney's fees to the successful claimant? Is substan
tial compliance sufficient? Curiously, the Courts of Appeals do not
agree on the circumstances that warrant attorney's fees under
§ 928, and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue. The
controversy regarding § 928(b) essentially boils down to a question
of statutory interpretation: are the provisions outlined in the sec
tion properly treated as rigid preconditions to recovery or merely as
procedural elements to the dispute resolution process? Subpart A
of this Part discusses the historical disagreement between the cir
cuits and their respective reasoning on the issue. Finally, subpart B
discusses a recent decision in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which served as the Circuit's first opinion on the issue of
attorney's fees awarded under § 928(b), and attempts to discover
whether the decision settles the dispute or simply further confuses
an already complex issue.
A.

The Circuit Split
1.

The Ninth Circuit: National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v.
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued one of the
first major decisions interpreting § 928(b) in National Steel & Ship
107. While the focus of this Note is solely on the controversy around subsection
(b) of § 928 of the LHWCA, it is worth noting that there is also some dispute about the
circumstances giving rise to a proper award of attorney's fees under subsection (a).
Disagreement exists as to what constitutes a failure to pay "any" compensation under
the subsection, what formality is required to constitute "filing a claim," and how the
courts should handle supplemental claims (i.e., a temporary total disability that later
gives rise to a permanent partial disability claim stemming from the same injury).

854

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:833

building Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs. 108 The
employee, Holston, injured his right knee while working for Na
tional Steel in August of 1974,109 and his employer paid temporary
total disability benefits under the LHWCA between the date of in
jury and his return to work in May 1975.110 Holston filed a claim
for permanent partial disability benefits two months later, appar
ently still suffering from the injury.111 The claimant and his em
ployer, National Steel, were unable to agree either on the extent of
the injury, or his average weekly wage,11Z and submitted the dispute
to an informal conference before an assistant deputy commissioner
from the Department of Labor. 113 The informal conference, which
took place on January 26, 1976, did not resolve the dispute, and the
Commissioner referred the matter directly to formal hearing before
an AU, without issuing any written recommendation as to the how
the dispute ought to be resolved. 1l4 The ALJ sided with Holston's
assertions as to the weekly wage he was entitled to,115 as well as the
extent of the permanent partial disability.116 The ALJ further or
dered the employer to pay $1200 of Holston's attorney's fees pursu
ant to § 928(b).117 The employer appealed to the BRB, which not
only affirmed the ALl's determinations, but also assessed an addi
tional $1200 in attorney's fees for the claimant's representation dur
ing the appeal. 118 The employer again appealed.119
Holston's employer argued that an award of attorney's fees
under § 928(b) was improper because the deputy commissioner did
not issue a written recommendation for the employer to accept or
108. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1979).
109. Id. at 877.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. An injured worker's average weekly wage serves as the basis upon which
compensation amounts are calculated for the great majority of disabilities. See 33
V.S.c. §§ 908-910 (2000).
113. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 606 F.2d at 877.
114. Id.
115. Holston asserted that his weekly wage was $244.66 at the time of his injury,
approximately $35 more than the weekly wage his employer contended. Id. at 877-78.
This difference would have amounted to nearly a $2000 deficiency at the end of one
year.
116. Holston contended that his injury resulted in a permanent twenty-five per
cent (partial) loss of use of his leg; the AU determined that a twenty percent loss was
reasonable and computed Holston'S compensation on that basis. Id.
117. Id. at 878.
118. Id. at 878, 881.
119. See id. at 878.
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reject and that the absence of this element precluded recovery.120
Citing the purpose of the statute, the Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument and upheld the assessment of attorney's fees under
§ 928(b), stating, "[w]e do not believe that the statute contemplates
the making of a written recommendation by the deputy commis
sioner as a precondition ... [of] liability for attorney's fees. "121 The
court went on to say that it "would not set aside" the attorney's fee
award even if it "were ... to view the language requiring a written
recommendation as a precondition to liability for fees,"122 since the
recommendation that did follow the informal conference was refer
ral to the ALl, and that the course of proceedings allowed the court
to infer that "any explicit recommendation would have been re
jected by one of the parties."123 In other words, the course of pro
ceedings dictated by § 928(b) still did or would have substantively
occurred so as to have advanced the matter to formal
proceedings.124
In reaching its decision, the National Steel court relied on the
purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature enacting it,
which was the assessment of attorney's fees in connection with a
dispute over compensation resolved in favor of the employee
through formal proceedings.125 Two subsequent Ninth Circuit cases
served to clarify the rule of law first expressed in National Steel. 126
120. Id. at 881.
121. Id. at 882 ("The purpose of the statute is to authorize the assessment of legal
fees against employers in cases where the existence or extent of liability is controverted
and the employee-claimant succeeds in establishing liability or obtaining increased com
pensation in formal proceedings in which he or she is represented by counsel." (empha
sis added) (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-1441 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698,
4717)). Although the court cited the House Report to the 1972 LHWCA amendments,
the court actually misrepresented the substance of the Report. See H.R. REP. No. 92
1441; see also Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 629 (6th Cir.
2006), amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007).
122. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 606 F.2d at 882.
123. Id. The court also commented on the employer's failure to bring the omitted
written recommendation to the attention of the AU until it was no longer possible to
cure this defect. Id. Under those facts, the court indicated that it would not have over
turned the lower court's award of attorney's fees, even if it did view the written recom
mendation as a precondition to recovery. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id. ("The congressional intent was to limit liability to cases in which the par
ties disputed the existence or extent of liability, whether or not the employer had actually
rejected an administrative recommendation." (emphasis added)).
126. See Matulic v. OWCP, 154 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1998); Todd Shipyards Corp.
v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Pro
grams 127 involved a compensation dispute that was submitted to,
and resolved at, the informal conference held before the deputy
commissioner. 128 At that conference, the employer acknowledged
that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result
of his injury and prepared a stipulation that admitted the claimant's
right to compensation benefits associated therewith. 129 The parties
did not agree, however, on the employer's liability for claimant's
attorney's fees, and that issue was eventually resolved in formal
proceedings before the BRB, which assessed $5000 of the claim
ant's attorney's fees to the employer pursuant to § 928(b).130 On
appeal however, the Ninth Circuit overturned the award since
there was no controversy concerning liability on the amount of
compensation to be paid after the informal conference. [Those]
issues were resolved by [the employer's] concession and the par
ties' stipulation. Section 928(b) does not authorize the payment
of attorneys' fees if the only unresolved issue is whether attor
neys' fees awarded should be for services performed prior to the
successful termination of the informal conference. 131

Citing its earlier holding in National Steel, the Ninth Circuit de
clined to extend attorney's fees awards to circumstances in which
there was no dispute over liability to be resolved in formal
proceedings.132
The Ninth Circuit again addressed the nature of the dispute
and an associated assessment of attorney's fees in Matulic v. Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs .133 Matulic, the claimant, was
injured in September 1989, and his employer voluntarily paid tem
porary total disability benefits from the time of injury until his re
turn to work in December.134 After his return to work, Matulic
applied for permanent partial disability benefits, and a dispute
arose between employer and employee as to the extent of the in
jury.135 The parties presented the dispute to the OWCP for resolu
tion, and the OWCP issued a written recommendation as to the
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Todd Shipyards Corp., 950 F.2d 607.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61l.
Id. at 610-11.
Matulic v. OWCP, 154 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1055.
Id.
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extent of disability, as well as the weekly wage for use in benefit
compensation calculations. 136 The written recommendation, how
ever, was issued without an informal conference being held despite
the repeated requests from both employer and employee. 137 When
the parties were unable to settle the matter, and the OWCP also
failed to issue a final Compensation Order, the parties turned to an
AU for resolution. 138
The ALI determined that Matulic suffered a five percent per
manent disability as a result of his injury, set the weekly wage
amount upon which his compensation would be based, and denied
Matulic an award of attorney's feesp9 Apparently dissatisfied with
this result, the claimant filed an appeal with the BRB contesting the
method of weekly wage calculation and the denial of attorney's
fees, but the BRB affirmed. 140 Matulic petitioned for appellate re
view, and the case came before the Ninth Circuit.1 41
As to the weekly wage computation, the court found that Ma
tulic was entitled to greater compensation than that which the em
ployer was willing to pay.142 As to the attorney's fees, the court
contrasted Matulic's case with that of the employee in Todd Ship
yards and reversed the denial of attorney's fees.1 43 Finding that the
amount of compensation did remain in dispute after an attempt at
informal resolution,l44 and that the claimant, through his attorney,
was subsequently successful in obtaining a greater award in formal
proceedings, the court held that Matulic was entitled to attorney's
136.
137.
138.

[d.
[d.
[d. Although the Ninth Circuit's decision does not disclose the details of the

OWCP's written recommendation issued in the absence of an informal conference, the
fact that the parties continued to disagree indicates that the recommendation was re
jected by either the employer or employee, thus requiring the issue to be resolved via
formal proceedings. See id.
139.
140.

[d.
[d. The BRB did not assess the AU determinations, but rather failed to

take any action on the appeal for one year--conduct which had the effect of automati
cally affirming the AU's finding. [d.
141.
142.

[d.
[d. at 1056-57. The wage dispute centered around which of three calculation
methods was appropriate. [d. at 1055-56. Matulic, who ultimately prevailed, main

tained that he was entitled to a calculation method that yielded a weekly amount
greater than his employer was willing to pay. [d. at 1056-67.
143. [d. at 1060.
144. The court glossed over the lack of an informal conference on this point, and
instead considered the written recommendation "the functional equivalent of an infor
mal conference" for the purposes of assessing the dispute resolution process. [d.
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fees on that basis.145 The fact that the employer did not formally
reject the original recommendation by the OWCP made no differ
ence to the court, since the dispute clearly continued despite that
recommendation. 146 In other words, the court, relying on the pur
pose of the statute as originally stated in National Steel, focused on
the course of dispute resolution and the fact that the claimant pre
vailed in formal proceedings. 147
Overall, National Steel, Todd Shipyards, and Matulic all
demonstrate the Ninth Circuit's focus on the course of proceedings
and its disregard of the provisions of § 928(b) as "precondition [s] to
the imposition of liability for attorney's fees. "148 The Courts of Ap
peal for the Fifth and Fourth Circuits, however, take a decidedly
different approach.
2. The Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Fourth Circuits:
Pool Co. v. Cooper and Virginia International
Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards
Although the Fifth Circuit issued a number of opinions relating
to the application of § 928(b) following the 1972 LHWCA Amend
ments,149 the 2001 decision in Pool Co. v. Cooper is probably its
clearest and most strongly worded opinion on the issue of attor
ney's fees. In Cooper, the claimant sustained a knee injury requir
ing surgery in 1989. 150 His employer voluntarily paid temporary
145. [d. at 106l.
146. [d. at 1060. Part of the employer's argument that it was not liable for claim
ant's attorney's fees was its agreement to be bound by the recommendation of the
OWCP. Id. Given that the dispute was not resolved at that point, it is fair to assume
that the recommendation was favorable to the employer and that it "accepted" the
recommendation so as not to be liable for attorney's fees. Cf 33 U.S.c. § 928(b) (2000)
("If the employer or carrier refuse to accept such written recommendation, within four
teen days after its receipt by them, they shall payor tender to the employee in writing
the additional compensation, if any, to which they believe the employee is entitled.").
Even if the employer "accepted" the compensation recommendation, however,
§ 928(b) also provides a mechanism by which the employee may reject the employer's
tender of compensation and potentially still recover attorney's fees in connection with
formal proceedings to settle the issue. Id.; see supra note 105.
147. Matulic, 154 F.3d at 1060-6l.
148. Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1979);
see also Matulic, 154 F.3d at 1060-61; Todd Shipyards Corp. v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607,
610-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (focusing on the nature of the disputes before the court, rather
than the presence or absence of the provisions of § 928(b), when determining the pro
priety of attorney's fee awards).
149. See Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000), modified on
reh'g, 237 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000); FMC Corp. v. Perez, 128 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 1997);
Savannah Mach. & Shipyard Co. v. OWCP, 642 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1981).
150. Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 2001).
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total compensation benefits while he was recuperating and contin
ued to pay permanent partial disability benefits after he resumed
his position in 1990.151 Unfortunately, Cooper injured his knee a
second time in 1992, requiring another surgery.152 Once again, the
employer voluntarily paid temporary total disability benefits, and
later, permanent partial disability benefits.I53 One year after the
second surgery, Cooper's surgeon determined that the knee had im
proved as much as could be expected, resulting in a twenty percent
loss of use.1 54 Within two months of the surgeon's disability deter
mination, Cooper's employer stopped making all disability pay
ments. I55 Unable to return to his previous position as a deckhand,
Cooper sought alternate employment as a security guard, but con
tinued to experience pain in his knee. 156
In February 1995, Cooper filed a claim for additional benefits
with the OWCP.157 His previous employer disputed his right to any
additional benefits and filed the appropriate forms with the
OWCP.1 58 Although advised by the OWCP of Pool Company's po
sition, Cooper never replied.159 By 1997, and after yet another sur
gery, Cooper again sought additional benefits in connection with his
knee injury, this time before an AU.160 The AU made a number
of determinations as to the duration and nature of disability in the
preceding years and consequently awarded benefits pursuant to
those determinations. 161 The judge, and later, the BRB, also
awarded Cooper his attorney's fees. 162
Once the case was before the Fifth Circuit, the issue of attor
ney's fees under § 928(b) was disposed of quickly. While the Ninth
Circuit evaluated the course of proceedings in connection with a
dispute over compensation, the Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed
this evaluation in favor of a straightforward, if not rigid, assessment:
It is clear that the BRB erred in awarding attorney's fees under
§ [9]28(b). Pool did pay compensation without an award; a con
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 177.
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troversy about the amount of additional compensation did subse
quently arise; and Cooper subsequently did obtain a
compensation award in excess of what Pool was willing to pay.
However, as the parties concur, no informal conference with the
Department of Labor ever took place. Under the law of our Cir
cuit, that fact poses an absolute bar to an award of attorney's fees
under § [9]28(bP63

The Cooper decision served to solidify and clarify that which earlier
Fifth Circuit cases had already established-§ 928(b) is to be con
strued strictly and its provisions are to be considered preconditions
to recovery of attorney's fees. 164
In 2005, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's ap
proach to § 928(b) in Virginia International Terminals, Inc. v. Ed
wards. 165 In that case, the claimant, Edwards, was injured on
February 22, 2002 and filed a claim for disability benefits on Febru
ary 28, 2002.166 His employer promptly paid temporary total bene
fits for the period from February 26, March 31, when a doctor
determined that Edwards could return to work. 167 In July, how
ever, Edwards, through counsel, requested benefits for the three
days between the date of injury and the commencement of disabil
ity payments, and further requested an informal conference in con
nection with same.1 68 The OWCP communicated the request to
Edwards's employer, which responded with a request for medical
records to support the claim for benefits during those three days.169
Edwards refused to supply the documentation and instead asked
that the matter be formally resolved before an AU.1 70 Instead of
163. Id. at 186 (emphasis added). The court did, however, award attorney's fees
under § 928(a). Id.
164. See Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404, 408-09 (5th Cir. 2000), modified
on reh'g, 237 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000). In Staftex Staffing, the court denied an attorney's
fee award since the disputed issue was never submitted to an informal conference, and a
written recommendation was never issued. Id. However, upon rehearing, the award of
attorney's fees was reinstated. Id.; see also FMC Corp. v. Perez, 128 F.3d 908, 910 (5th
Cir. 1997) (denying an award of attorney's fees, noting its propriety under § 928(b)
"only if the dispute has been the subject of an informal conference with the Department
of Labor"); Savannah Mach. & Shipyard Co. v. OWCP, 642 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir.
1981) ("[I]f the other requirements of section [9]28(b) are met, an employee who ac
cepts partial compensation, but who claims additional compensation, may receive attor
ney's fees." (emphasis added»; infra Part V.
165. Va. In!'1 Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, 398 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2005).
166. Id. at 315.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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pursuing formal proceedings, the employer chose instead simply to
pay disability benefits for the three days and close the matter. l7l
Edwards then petitioned the court for attorney's fees incurred in
connection with the disputed three days.l72 Although the AU re
jected the claim based on the provisions of § 928(b), the BRB
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 928(a).173 The employer ap
pealed to the Court of Appeals for relief, arguing that neither sub
section justified the award. 174
After meticulously analyzing the language of both subsections
and how they relate to one another,175 the court agreed with the
employer that neither subsection allowed for an award of attorney's
fees in this caseP6 As to § 928(b), the court referred to the provi
sions of the section as "mandatory statutory conditions,"177 and
held that "[t]he failure to hold an informal conference or issue a
written recommendation is fatal to a claim for attorney's fees under
the plain terms of section 928(b). "178
Like the Fifth Circuit in Cooper, the Fourth Circuit adopted a
bright-line rule as to the propriety of attorney's fee awards under
§ 928(b)-if all of the provisions of the subsection have not been
met, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate. 179 With the
Ninth Circuit firmly rooted in its "course of dispute resolution" ap
proach to the imposition of attorney's fees under § 928(b), and the
Fifth and Fourth Circuits just as firmly rooted in their bright-line
"provisions as preconditions to recovery" approach, which ap
proach is correct?
171.
172.

[d.
[d.

173.
174.
175.
the same
meaning,
176.

[d.
[d.

[d. at 316-17. The court relied heavily on the notion that adjacent sections of
statute must be read together and that in order to give both sections distinct
subsection (b) must be read strictly. See id.
[d. at 316.
177. [d. at 318.
178. [d. The court repeated this sentiment later on in the opinion: "Plainly, under
section 928(b), a fee award is not available absent an informal conference and written
recommendation. None occurred here, and so Edwards was not entitled to a fee award
under this subsection." [d. at 318-19.
179. [d. at 319; see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP
(Moody), 474 F.3d 109, 114 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Because [claimant] satisfies all of the
requirements of § 928(b), he is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees he incurred
...."); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP (Hassell), 477 F.3d 123,
126 (4th Cir. 2007) ("The threshold requirements of § 928(b) are satisfied ....").
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Background

In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its
first opinion on circumstances warranting attorney's fees under
§ 928(b).1 80 Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock CO. V. OWCPl8l involved
an injury that rendered the claimant permanently and totally dis
abled, and unable to return to work. 182 Before the disability deter
mination through formal proceedings before an ALl, the claimant,
Bordeaux, underwent years of medical and psychological treatment
as well as physical and cognitive therapies in an attempt to improve
the cognitive functions damaged by the injury.183 Although Bor
deaux exhibited some improvement, his recovery arguably
plateaued by the time the issue of disability was determined at the
formal hearing. 184 The "plateau" formed the central issue in the
dispute: the employer contended that Bordeaux's cognitive injuries
had not yet reached maximum medical improvement and thus were
not "permanent."185 Since Bordeaux's doctors had noted that there
was a possibility that additional psychotherapy and antidepressant
medications might improve Bordeaux's cognitive functions,186 the
employer refused to pay permanent total disability benefits.187
180. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir.
2006), amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007). The amended decision reflects only a
technical change in the decision, remanding the matter for additional proceedings to set
the amount of attorney fees charged to the claimant pursuant to § 928(c) of the statute.
See Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 473 F.3d at 267. Section 928(c) requires that the
claimant's attorney's fees, when assessed to the claimant, must be approved and fixed
by the deputy commissioner, BRB, or court. See 33 U.S.c. § 928(c) (2000).
181. For the facts of Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., see supra notes 1-17 and
accompanying text.
182. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 619-20.
183. Id. Bordeaux attended speech therapy to help with his memory and atten
tion span, took a variety of antidepressants to treat anxiety and depression (each of
which produced intolerable side effects and ultimately had to be stopped), and was
examined and treated by a psychologist, a neuropsychologist, and a neurologist, all in
an attempt to find a course or courses of treatment that would improve his disability.
Id.
184. Id. Bordeaux's psychologist and neuropsychologist both testified at the for
mal hearing that his cognitive injuries had reached "maximum medical improvement."
His neurologist testified that additional psychotherapy, as urged by the employer,
would not treat his cognitive problems, nor improve the degree of cognitive disability.
Id.
185. Id. at 621.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 622. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the employer even went so far
as to file a motion to compel Bordeaux to undergo additional psychotherapy (which
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Bordeaux and his employer had initially attempted to settle the
matter informally188 via the LHWCA's dispute resolution pro
cess.1 89 Following the informal conference held on September 19,
2002, the claims review officer from the OWCP issued a written
recommendation, but, curiously, one that stated he was not making
a recommendation since the parties were attempting to settle. 190 In
any event, settlement never occurred and the matter was formally
determined by the AU decision issued in January of 2004, which
awarded medical benefits, temporary total disability compensation
from the date of injury until August 20, 2002, and permanent total
disability compensation from that point on. 191 The ALJ also as
sessed attorney's fees pursuant to § 928(a) of the LHWCA. The
employer appealed this decision to the BRB, but the BRB upheld
the ALI's award, including that for attorney's fees-but this time
pursuant to § 928(b).192 When the employer again appealed the de
cision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the pre
vious decisions, except with regard to the award of attorney's
fees. 193
2.

Majority Opinion

Noting the existing circuit split regarding the interpretation
and application of § 928(b),194 the Sixth Circuit first examined the
included resuming the antidepressants that his body was unable to tolerate) or have his
compensation benefits suspended. Id. at 623.
188. The employer contended that three informal conferences were held in con
nection with the extent and permanence of Bordeaux's injuries, but the court only
found evidence of one in the record. Id. at 625 n.3.
189. See 33 U.S.c. §§ 914(d), 914(h), 919 (2000).
190. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 625. The respondent Bor
deaux's appellate brief alleges that the claims review officer actually recommended a
settlement figure of $200,000. See Final Brief of Respondent Thomas Bordeaux, supra
note 1, at 31. However, the petitioner-employer's brief states that the claims review
officer made no recommendation in writing as to the disposition of the "permanence of
disability" dispute. Final Brief of Petitioners at 33-34, Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co.
v. OWCP, (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 05-3425).
191. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 620. August 20, 2002, was the
date that the AU determined that Bordeaux became permanently totally disabled, pre
sumably based on testimony from one of the doctors, who determined that August 20,
2002 to be the date on which Bordeaux's injuries had reached "maximum medical im
provement." Id.
192. [d. See supra note 105 and accompanying text to compare the language of
subsections (a) and (b), and the circumstances under which each subsection should be
applied.
193. [d. at 629.
194. Id. at 627.
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holdings of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. 195 Finding merit
in reliance on the plain language of § 928(b) by the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits, the Sixth Circuit adopted the bright line, "provisions as
preconditions to recovery" approach. 196 After determining that the
plain language of the section is clear and unambiguous,197 the ma
jority attacked the Ninth Circuit's reliance on statutory purpose and
legislative history first expressed in National Steel as inappropriate
considering the plain language of the statute. 198 Finding "no writ
ten recommendation regarding the disposition of the controversy,"
the court reversed the BRB's award of attorney's fees under
§ 928(b); and finding § 928(a) inapplicable as well,199 the court de
clined an award of attorney's fees altogether. 20o
3.

The Dissenting Opinion

Despite the relative ease with which the majority was able to
reach its decision on the matter of attorney's fees, one judge wrote
a dissent to express her disagreement with both the reasoning and
the result:
Denying fees to Bordeaux based on rigid formalities that are not
expressly mandated by the statute is contrary to two of the pri
mary concerns underlying the [LHWCA]: the availability of
quick recovery for valid workplace-injury claims without resort
to the courts, and when this fails, claimants' full recovery of stat
utory benefits without reduction by the cost of legal services.201

Judge Moore wrote that she would have awarded Bordeaux's attor
ney's fees under either § 928(a) or (b).202
With regard to § 928(b) specifically, Judge Moore took issue
with the majority's characterization of the plain language of the
subsection dictating preconditions to recovery when the statute
195. Id. at 627-29.
196. Id. at 628.
197. Id. ("The language of subsection (b) plainly states that in order for fees to be
assessed under its terms there must be a written recommendation containing a sug
gested disposition of the controversy.").
198. Id. at 629. Notwithstanding the improper use of legislative history when the
language is clear, the majority also went on to note that the court in National Steel
actually misstated the legislative history on which it relied, and for that reason as well,
found the Ninth Circuit's approach faulty and without merit. Id.; see supra notes 108
125 and accompanying text.
199. Id. at 626-27.
200. Id. at 629.
201. Id. at 629-30 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
202. Id. at 635.
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does not identify them as such.203 She noted that the subsection is
silent as to a situation like Bordeaux's, in which the provisions out
lined in the subsection have not been met "through no fault of the
claimant, but rather as a result of the agency's failure to follow its
duties."204 Clearly distressed by the effect of the majority's decision
on people situated similarly to Bordeaux, Judge Moore emphasized
the failure of the agency to discharge its statutory duties 205 and the
absence of fault (and control) the claimant had over his ability to
cure the dispute procedure's shortcomings. 206 Reasoning that de
nying attorney's fees pursuant to § 928(b) in these circumstances
"would be at odds with the policies underlying the [LHWCA],"
Judge Moore concluded that Bordeaux should have recovered his
attorney's fees pursuant to that subsection. 207
With nearly thirty years of reasoning employed by four sepa
rate courts of appeal and the circuit split still intact, the question
remains: what is the proper interpretation and application of the
provisions of § 928(b) of the LHWCA? By undertaking inquiries
into (1) the plain meaning of the subsection; (2) the legislative in
tent embodied in both the language of the Act as a whole and as
represented in judicial decisions since the Act's enactment; and (3)
the genesis of workers' compensation law, this Note attempts to an
swer that precise question in Part IV.
IV.

EQUITY AND HISTORY DEMAND SUBSTANCE OVER FORM

The LHWCA provides a compensation mechanism for on-the
job injuries sustained by maritime workers. 20s The purpose under
lying the statute is to provide prompt and adequate compensation
203. Id. at 634.
204. Id.
205. Id.
[T]he claims officer failed to follow his statutory obligation of making a rec
ommendation disposing of the controversy and instead directly contravened
the statute by stating that he was making "no recommendation." ... The em
ployer should not secure a windfall because the claims officer shirked his stat
utory duty, particularly when nothing in the statute mandates that we enforce
such preconditions to recovery.
Id. (citation omitted).
206. Id. ("Bordeaux requested and participated in the informal conference .... It
is no fault of Bordeaux that the claims review officer did not make a recommendation
on the disputed issue."); see also id. at 634 n.7 ("[T]he lack of a written recommenda
tion was in no way a result of any deficiency on the part of Bordeaux.")
207. Id. at 635.
208. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950
(2000).
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for valid workplace injury claims.209 When injured workers have
not successfully obtained adequate compensation for their injuries
through the statutory claims process, and subsequently must resort
to the courts to secure those benefits, the LHWCA also provides a
mechanism in two limited circumstances for the successful claimant
to shift his or her legal fees to the employer. Subsection (a) of
§ 928 addresses the circumstance when the employer disputes liabil
ity and refuses to pay any compensation,210 while subsection (b) ad
dresses the circumstance in which the employer paid some
compensation, but a dispute later arises as to the amount of com
pensation due. 211 Aside from these circumstances, the statute ex
pressly prohibits fee-shifting in any other situation. 212
The courts are particularly divided over appropriate attorney's
fee awards under subsection (b), which delineates procedural ante
cedents for recovery of attorney's fees. 213 The controversy is one of
statutory interpretation: are the provisions of subsection (b) rigid
prerequisites to fee awards? The Fourth, Fifth, and most recently,
the Sixth Circuits have ruled in favor of strict statutory interpreta
tion, citing the plain language of subsection (b) and holding that the
absence of precise compliance with its provisions precludes recov
ery of the claimant's attorney's fees. 214 The Ninth Circuit, however,
has favored a broad statutory interpretation, and, citing the stat
ute's purpose, has held that provisions of subsection (b) are not to
be read as inflexible preconditions to a claimant's award of attor
ney's fees. 215
209. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 630 (Moore, J., dissenting).
210. 33 U.S.c. § 928(a).
211. Id. § 928(b).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 456 F.3d at 629 (reversing an award of
attorney's fees, citing the absence of a written recommendation); Va. Int'I Terminals v.
Edwards, 398 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming the BRB's denial of attorney's
fees under subsection (b), citing the absence of both an informal conference and written
recommendation); Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2001) (reversing an
award of attorney's fees under subsection (b), citing the absence of an informal confer
ence); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. OWCP, 474 F.3d 109,
113 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming an award of attorney's fees, citing the occurrence of an
informal conference on the disputed matter, a written recommendation, the employer's
rejection of the recommendation, and the claimant's subsequent use of an attorney to
secure compensation benefits in excess of those the employer originally tendered).
215. See Nat'l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OWCP, 606 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir.
1979) (affirming an award of attorney's fees under subsection (b) in the absence of a
written recommendation, citing the general statutory purpose "to authorize the assess
ment of legal fees against employers in cases where the existence or extent of liability is

2009]

FORM OVER SUBSTANCE?

867

Which interpretation is correct? Based on the language of the
statute, the historical context that gave rise to workers' compensa
tion law, and the judiciary's well-established policy of liberal inter
pretation and broad application of the LHWCA, the Ninth Circuit's
approach, which embraces the liberal policies of eighty years of pre
cedent, is the proper analytical framework.
A.

The Statute's "Plain Meaning" Is Not Plain

The first place to start in questions of statutory interpretation
is the language itself.216 When the meaning of statutory language is
clear, the courts must enforce the statute according to its terms.217
What, then, is the plain meaning of § 928(b)?
The courts often utilize canons of construction as interpretive
aids when they are asked to assign meaning to statutory language.
Many basic canons of construction concern how language is used
and how to discern meaning from the language employed.2 18 For
example, an initial inquiry might evaluate whether the terms uti
lized in the subsection are used in their ordinary sense or are "terms
of art" to which the legislature has assigned a special meaning. 219
Since the controversy around subsection (b) centers on whether the
steps provided are strict prerequisites to attorney's fee awards, it is
important to focus on the words associated with each of those steps.
controverted and the employee-claimant succeeds in establishing liability or obtaining
increased compensation in formal proceedings in which he or she is represented by
counsel"); see also Matulic v. OWCP, 154 F.3d 1052, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (in award
ing attorney's fees, analysis focused on the statutory purpose stated in National Steel
and did not assess the extent of adherence to the provisions outlined in subsection (b»;
cf Todd Shipyards Corp. v. OWCP, 950 F.2d 607, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (in reversing
award of attorney's fees, contrasted statutory purpose stated in National Steel and
noted that there was no controversy following an informal conference, nor a subsequent
formal proceeding to secure additional benefits).
216. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) ("We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself."); see also Am. To
bacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580 (1981); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981); Appleton v. First Nat'l Bank of
Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir. 1995).
217. United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); see also YULE
KIM, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
AND RECENT TRENDS 4 (2008), www.fas.orglsgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. The so-called
"plain meaning rule" states that when the meaning of the statutory language is clear,
the judiciary need not undertake any further investigation to discern meaning; there is a
presumption that the statute means what it says, and if that meaning is clear, that is the
end of judicial analysis. [d.
218. KIM, supra note 217, at summary.
219. [d. at 5-6.
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In this case, the operative word is "shall,"220 which is commonly
understood to mean that the action is mandatory as opposed to
discretionary.221
What then, are the mandatory directives? The Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Circuits have determined that the "plain meaning" of the
statute mandates, at the very least, the occurrence of the informal
conference and the issuance of the written recommendation, as
these elements of § 928(b) have been amply litigated. 222 This inter
pretation, however, is inaccurate: careful evaluation of the language
surrounding the all-important word "shall" in every instance pro
duces a slightly different meaning. The statute's use of "shall" cre
ates statutory obligations for the deputy commissioner or Board
and the employer, rather than creating threshold events for attor
ney's fee awards. The phrase "the deputy commissioner or Board
shall set the matter for an informal conference" is quite different
than "an informal conference shall be required."223 This is also true
for the written recommendation: "the deputy commissioner or
Board shall recommend in writing" does not imply "a written rec
ommendation shall be required."224 In other words, rather than
simply requiring that certain events occur and assigning that re
sponsibility to everyone by specifying no one, the statute mandates
the discharge of a duty by specifically assigning it to the deputy
commissioner or Board. In the sense that Congress means what it
says and chooses its language carefully, it is reasonable that the
plain meaning of the statute creates a statutory duty that is charge
able to the claims review officer and not a threshold event in the
220. Relevant excerpts from 33 U.S.C. § 928(b) include "deputy commissioner or
Board shall set the matter for an informal conference," "deputy commissioner or Board
shall recommend in writing a disposition of the controversy," "employer or carrier ...
shall pay [the recommended compensation] or tender to the employee [a written
counter offer]," and "if the compensation thereafter awarded is greater than the
amount paid ... reasonable attorney's feels] ... shall be awarded in addition to the
amount of compensation." 33 U.S.c. § 928(b) (2000) (emphases added).
221. KIM, supra note 217, at 9.
222. See supra Parts III.A.2 and 1I1.B.2 for a discussion of those cases addressing
informal conferences and written recommendations pursuant to § 928(b).
223. The statute actually reads, in part
If ... a controversy develops over the amount of additional compensation ...
to which the employee may be entitled, the deputy commissioner or Board
shall set the matter for an informal conference and following such conference
the deputy commissioner or Board shall recommend in writing a disposition of
the controversy.
33 U.S.c. § 928(b) (emphases added).
224. See id. (emphases added).
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dispute resolution process, as interpreted by the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Circuits.
If all parties involved-employer, employee, and claims review
officer-participate in the dispute resolution process as Congress
had envisioned, the distinction between threshold preconditions to
recovery and the discharge of statutory duties is irrelevant because
all steps are satisfied. The distinction becomes relevant when the
steps are not followed precisely,22s thus illuminating the provision's
latent ambiguity. What exactly is required under § 928(b): the oc
currence of threshold events or the discharge of statutory duties?
Since the courts have found merit in the "threshold event" in
terpretation, and the "plain meaning" of subsection (b) is unclear in
light of the possible "statutory duty" interpretation, the next step
the court would undertake is to evaluate whether there are "equally
plausible interpretations." If so, the court must take pains to
choose a reading that would "avoid a patently unjust result."226
Bordeaux's situation is a prime example for this sort of evaluation.
Courts applying the strict "threshold event" interpretation would
deny recovery of attorney's fees. This result however is unjust for
Bordeaux, the injured worker, since his ability to recover the legal
fees he incurred during the lengthy process to obtain additional
compensation was completely barred as a consequence of a third
party's failure to issue the written recommendation. 227 No matter
how precisely Bordeaux followed the prescribed claims process, this
oversight, willful or merely negligent, cut into his compensation
award by thousands of dollars. The failure of the deputy commis
sioner resulted in prejudice to the claimant, as the dissenting judge
zealously pointed OUt. 228
If the court instead read the statute liberally to require only
that the commissioner issue a recommendation, the court might still
award Bordeaux his attorney's fees, since failure to comply was not
the fault of the claimant. Further, the substantive process still oc
curred: a dispute arose as to the extent of the employer's liability
225. See cases discussed supra Part III.
226. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBlE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCfION § 45:12 (7th ed. 2007); see also United States v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("[W]hen the plain meaning ... pro
duce[s] ... an unreasonable [result] 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation
as a whole,' [we are to] follow[] that purpose, rather than the literal words." (footnote
omitted)).
227. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. OWCP, 456 F.3d 616, 629 (6th Cir.
2006), amended by 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007).
228. [d. at 634 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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for the claimant's injuries; the dispute was not resolved by the pre
scribed administrative proceedings; and the claimant, with the assis
tance of counsel, resorted to the courts to obtain a compensation
award greater than that which the employer was initially willing to
pay. To the extent that the two readings are equally plausible, the
canon of construction favoring results that do not produce injustice
clearly supports a liberal construction of § 928(b).
It is true that the plain meaning of the statutory language is
generally regarded as conclusive evidence of its intended applica
tion and, in the absence of ambiguity, there is no need for further
judicial analysis. 229 The Supreme Court long ago recognized, how
ever, that the plain-meaning rule "is rather an axiom of experience
than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persua
sive evidence if it exists."23o More than fifty years later, the Court
reaffirmed this notion in Watt. v. Alaska, wherein it recognized that
"[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may
persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common
meaning to have their literal effect."231 Bordeaux's situation
presents precisely such a dilemma: even supposing that the lan
guage of § 928(b) is sufficiently plain so as not to trigger additional
assessment pursuant to a determination of ambiguity, could Con
gress have ever intended the courts to adopt such a mindlessly lit
eral reading in light of the circumstances under which the
legislation was originally passed?

B.

The History and Intent of the Statute Support a Broad
Interpretation and Liberal Application

In light of the potential ambiguity regarding the plain meaning,
or alternatively, an inexplicably literal reading, of the language of
§ 928(b), it is appropriate to consider a few other canons of con
struction. When the precise meaning of statutory language is un
clear, and as a consequence, the proper interpretation and
application are unknowable, courts' analyses have long relied on
the basic rule that "a statute should be read as a harmonious whole,
with its various parts being interpreted within their broader statu
tory context in a manner that furthers statutory purposes. "232
229. For a discussion of the plain-meaning rule, see supra note 217 and accompa
nying text.
230. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
231. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,266 (1981).
232. KIM, supra note 217, at 2; see also Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,
158 (1990) ("In determining the meaning of the statute, [the court] look[s] not only to
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In this case, there is ample statutory context and statutory pur
pose to consult. This Note reviewed the socioeconomic circum
stances that gave rise to workers' compensation as a body of law. 233
Under the common law, workers often had exceedingly limited
remedies for injuries, and could rely only on the discretionary gen
erosity of their employers, families, or friends. 234 Those that could
resort to the courts experienced great delay in receiving compensa
tion (if any compensation were received at all), significant cost, and
wildly inconsistent results. Unsatisfied with this state of affairs,
lawmakers revamped the system to humanize and standardize in
jury compensation proceedings. Two main objectives were borne
out of workers' unsatisfactory experience with the compensation
"system" as it existed prior to the turn of the twentieth century: (1)
to provide injured workers a prompt, uniform, and efficient com
pensation process without having to resort to the courts;235 and (2)
to assess the costs of injury to the industries that produced them. 236
In other words, workers' compensation arose as a remedial al
ternative to the inadequate and inequitable remedies originally
available at common law. Statutes that are remedial in nature
ought to be liberally construed to effectuate that purpose. 237 Over
the last century, workers' compensation legislation has exhibited a
general trend of enlarging the scope of coverage to an increasing
number of activities, persons, and injuries.238 From this general
trend, one could reasonably infer a congressional intent to broaden,
rather than narrow, the application of workers' compensation legis
lation. As a general matter, Congress has indicated a preference
for broad and liberal application of the workers' compensation stat
utory remedies, consistent with the general rule regarding remedial
1egislation.239 Inasmuch as attorney's fee awards under the
the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its
object and policy."); 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 226, § 46:5.
233. See supra Part I.
234. HOROVITZ, supra note 25, at 2.
235. 1 SCHNEIDER, supra note 44, at 4-5.
236. Id. at 2; see, e.g., Bundy v. Vt. State Highway Dep't, 146 A. 68, 69 (Vt. 1929)
("The ultimate purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act ... is to treat the cost of
personal injuries incidental to the employment as a part of the cost of the business."
(citation omitted».
237. See Staftex Staffing v. OWCP, 237 F.3d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2000); Empire
United Stevedores v. Gatlin, 936 F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1991).
238. LARSON, supra note 28, at 28.
239. See, e.g., Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977)
("[Broad] construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation."); Peyton v. Rowe,
391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968) (the court's interpretation of "the statute is consistent with the
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LHWCA are remedial in nature, it follows that their application
requires adherence to the general rule: broad interpretation and lib
eral application.
The same is true for the more specific workers' compensation
provisions of the LHWCA. The LHWCA was passed in response
to repeated failed attempts to apply state compensation remedies
for injuries sustained by workers under maritime and admiralty
law. 240 The concern about leaving an injured worker without a
practical remedy, or any remedy at all, provides some insight about
the motivations behind the Act's enactment. The purpose of the
LHWCA, as restated by the Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat
court, is to relieve an injured worker of the financial burdens associ
ated with his injury and, further, to assign the cost of injury to the
industry that produced it. 241
In the years following enactment, the legislature and courts
have taken steps to effectuate and broaden this basic purpose. The
1972 LHWCA Amendments were passed to "provide adequate in
come replacement," noting that "adequate workmen's compensa
tion benefits are ... essential to meeting the needs of the injured
employee and his family."242 This is evidence of Congress's intent
to ensure adequate compensation. The 1972 Amendments also in
creased scope of coverage landward, to cover those workers injured
in the previously legal "grey area" between the shore and "naviga
ble waters." This single addition produced widespread change for
claims under the LHWCA, as it provided remedies for those work
ers previously left without, which is further evidence of a congres
sional objective to ensure that all those in need of coverage could
avail themselves of the LHWCA's remedies, a sort of no-maritime
worker-left-behind approach.
The courts have similarly stressed the importance of liberal
construction, beginning in 1932 with Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat. Even in cases where the precise requirements of the
canon of construction that remedial statutes should be liberally construed"); Tcher
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("[W]e are guided by the familiar canon of
statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectu
ate its purposes."); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (1 Wall.) 493, 504 (1870) ("The statute is a
remedial one and should be construed liberally to carry out the wise and salutary pur
poses of its enactment. ").
240. For discussion of jurisdictional "hiccups" when maritime workers compensa
tion was beginning to take shape, see Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917), and companion cases cited supra Part II.
241. See BaIt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932).
242. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4699.
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statute have not been carried out, the courts have looked to the
substantive aspects of the process and the overall fairness of the
result, taking care to avoid any unduly severe, unfair, or anomalous
consequence to the worker. 243 Only in the most isolated, well-de
fined situations have the courts been unwilling to extend liberal
construction to claimants. 244
Insofar as both the legislature and judiciary have expressed a
clear preference for broad statutory interpretation and liberal con
struction to effectuate. the purpose of adequate compensation for
maritime workers, that construction ought to apply to the applica
tion of attorney's fee awards under § 928(b). Strict compliance
leads to fewer attorneys' fee awards, and fewer attorneys' fee
awards will lead to a reduction of compensation benefits by the cost
to secure them.
Requiring strict compliance with the provisions of the statute
not only contradicts the plain language of the Act and the over
whelming history of liberal application of other provisions of the
LHWCA, but also contradicts the considerations that created work
ers' compensation law in the first place. Accordingly, the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits' "provisions as preconditions to recovery"
approach is unfounded.
C.

Congress Would Not Have Intended to Hold Others' Failures
to Discharge Their Statutory Duties Against the Injured
Worker

Returning for a moment to the language of subsection (b), the
plain-meaning assessment revealed certain statutory duties related
to the disputed claim.245 As a result of the statutory obligations,
this Note finally contends that when the claimant has undertaken
good faith attempts to participate in the dispute resolution process,
and either the reviewing authority or the employer (or both) has
failed to discharge its statutory obligations under subsection (b), the
court ought to construe the subsection liberally on grounds of eq
243. See, e.g., Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S 328, 334 (1953); supra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text.
244. The courts have drawn the "liberal construction" line in two situations:
those in which the claimant is pursuing a claim without merit-for example, Metropoli
tan Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1993)-and those in which a liberal
construction in favor of the claimant would require the court to pervert or alter the
plain meaning of the language employed by Congress-for example, Pillsbury v. United
Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952), and OWCP v. Robertson, 625 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.
1980).
245. See supra Part IV.A.
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uity and of the LHWCA's purpose of adequate compensation undi
minished by the cost to litigate the right to that compensation.
Had the drafters anticipated the possibility that all parties may
not participate in the administrative claims dispute resolution pro
cess as required by statute, they likely would have pointed to the
purpose of compensating valid workplace injuries. 246 Accordingly,
courts should consider the longstanding notion that the LHWCA
should be liberally construed to avoid harsh and incongruous re
sultS. 247 Congress could not have viewed the statutory failures of
others as posing a legitimate bar to a claimant's recovery of attor
ney's fees. Allowing a party to evade his responsibility would en
able the employer to avoid assessment of legal fees by simply-and
without penalty-failing to discharge his statutory obligations. 248
Leaving the claimant to shoulder the financial burden of even the
most legitimate claim is compLeteLy contrary to the very spirit of the
Act. Accordingly, had the drafters anticipated this bad faith sce
nario, they almost certainly would have closed this legislative loop
hole. As the legislature did not contemplate this possibility, courts
must construe § 92S(b) liberally so as to avoid the harsh and incon
gruous consequences of strict construction.
This approach best achieves the goal of adequate and prompt
compensation for valid workplace injuries without resort to the
courts. Legislatures and courts are concerned with fairness and eq
uity. In fact, the inclusion of a fee-shifting provision in the
LHWCA may have been another congressional mechanism to ef
fectuate its general purpose. If employers are on notice that they
may bear the cost of a successful claimant's attorney's fees (should
the matter end up in court), they may be encouraged to negotiate a
compensation benefit in good faith, promptly, fairly, and efficiently.
Ultimately, these are the key concerns of an injured worker and the
concerns that motivated workers' compensation statutes in the first
246. Congress apparently presumed that the reviewing authority and employer
would discharge their duties as directed, and did not contemplate the consequence if
they failed to do so, as there is no provision addressing such a situation. "[W]here the
drafters of a statute did not contemplate a specific situation, that statute should be
construed in conformity with the probable intent of the draftsmen as if they had antici
pated the situation as it had been presented to the court." 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra
note 226, § 45:12.
247. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
248. Failure to tender the additional compensation that the employee believes is
due (a "precondition" in jurisdictions employing strict statutory construction of
§ 928(b» could potentially bar recovery for even the most legitimate claim.
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place. A liberal reading of subsection (b) achieves all of these
goals.
D.

Embedded in the Statute Is an Additional Workable
Approach

Despite the overwhelming trend to liberally construe other
provisions of the LHWCA, the majority of circuits that have inter
preted the fee-shifting provision have done so strictly, citing the
plain language and treating the steps outlined as threshold events
for fee recovery. The Ninth Circuit's rule of liberal construction
makes it seem a renegade circuit on this issue. A closer look at the
decisions denying attorney's fees awards, however, suggests that the
courts might be doing something more substantive than merely ap
plying an overly strict construction.
In Virginia International Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, for exam
ple, the employer voluntarily paid benefits for the employee's in
jury in the absence of any award. 249 The three-day compensation
gap was initially disputed, but ultimately settled when the employer
chose to pay the disputed amount rather than subject itself to litiga
tion.250 Although the Fourth Circuit based its opinion on the lack of
the informal conference and associated written recommendation,251
the court's holding suggests a commitment to the broader purpose
of the statute of creating a process for employers and employees to
settle their disputes.
In substance, the employer did exactly what it was supposed to
do. Virginia International was willing to participate in the review
process regarding the disputed three days and, having decided to
avoid litigation and its associated costs and delay, simply paid the
additional benefits. The employer left the table with knowledge
that the matter had been efficiently attended to, and the employee
obtained prompt compensation. If the court were then also to as
sess attorney's fees, it would in essence be penalizing the very be
havior the statute sought to encourage. What motivation is there to
negotiate in good faith if the court could still assess attorney's fees
despite the employer's most virtuous treatment of a worker's
claim?
The holding in Pool Co. v. Cooper provides another illustration
of this point. In that case, the injured worker properly initiated a
249.
250.
251.

See Va. Int'I Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, 398 F.3d 313, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
[d.
[d. at 316-17.
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claim for benefits but failed to respond to the preliminary corre
spondence from the OWCP and the employer, which would have
enabled the matter to proceed to the informal conference stage. 252
The Fifth Circuit reversed the attorney's fee award, again based on
the lack of an informal conference and written recommendation. 253
Yet, as in Edwards, the court may have been making a common
sense judgment based on fairness to the employer, who was willing
to negotiate the claim according to the terms prescribed in the stat
ute. Here, it was the claimant who failed to participate in the pro
cess. It seems fundamentally unfair to reward the claimant's failure
to follow through from the "purse" of the party that remained will
ing to engage in the review process in good faith.
A more workable rule, then, is one that considers the provi
sions of subsection (b) but does not view them as rigid precondi
tions to attorney's fee awards. The liberal construction
overwhelmingly preferred can still be facilitated by looking at the
conduct of the parties in the midst of the claims process: actions
that suggest bad faith or lack of fair play on the part of the em
ployer ought to increase the court's likelihood of assessing attor
ney's fees. In cases where the claimant has "dropped the ball"
while the employer remained a willing participant in the process,
the courts might curtail the liberal construction so as to effectuate
both the purposes of the statute as well as overall fairness to all
parties involved. In cases where the employer or claims review of
ficer impedes informal dispute resolution, the courts ought to award
attorney's fees to a successful claimant as often as the statute per
mits. The employer and claims officer should not have any incen
tive to engage in conduct that has the potential to further injure a
claimant. To interpret the fee-shifting provision of the LHWCA in
any other manner will only perpetuate injustice for those in circum
stances like Bordeaux.
CONCLUSION

The Industrial Revolution produced lllJunes and socioeco
nomic hardship that prompted the state and federal governments to
reevaluate treatment of the labor force. The modern workers' com
pensation theory that has evolved operates to protect and compen
sate injured workers adequately, promptly, and without regard to
fault. Both state and federal legislatures have had ample practice in
252.
253.

Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 173, 176, 186 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 186.
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drafting statutes to carry out these goals, and the language Con
gress has chosen is owed significant deference. The Courts of Ap
peal for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have perverted the
meaning of § 928(b) of the LHWCA, inferring strict requirements
where Congress did not intend such rigidity. The result is a contra
diction of the liberal compensation goals established through many
years of legislative development and judicial application, undermin
ing the very purpose of workers' compensation law. For workers
like Bordeaux, those decisions can effectively victimize the em
ployee twice-first, at the time of injury, and second, when the cost
to fight for the right to compensation effectively reduces any award
obtained.
A more appropriate approach to this problem is to evaluate
the course of dispute resolution proceedings between the parties. It
is critical that the courts are mindful of the context in which the
injury and subsequent dispute arose, as well as the objectives of the
LHWCA. Bordeaux did everything in his power to follow proce
dure and participate in the dispute resolution process. Had the in
jury occurred in the Ninth Circuit, the court no doubt would have
recognized that Bordeaux's situation was exactly the sort that Con
gress had in mind when it provided for attorney's fee awards. In
stead, the Sixth Circuit's decision effectively negated the very
workers' compensation goals Bordeaux expected would protect
him-his injuries were permanent, his compensation delayed, and,
in view of the decision in Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., resort
to the court made his compensation inadequate. For Bordeaux, the
injustice is unconscionable.
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